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Surveys, polls, and focus groups are common phenomena in our 
daily lives. We live in a world where big data is big business. Large decisions 
hinge on the accuracy and predicative power of these numbers. Therefore, 
it should not be surprising that there is a market for the malicious manipu-
1ation of data. Extreme care must be taken in the collection, checking, and 
processing of data to prevent decisions from being made on incorrect as­
sumptions. In order to demonstrate the full potential and possible impact 
of these attacks, I shall provide the following example: 
John Doe is a member of the United States Senate. In recent years, 
the political pressure to make a preemptive strike against a potential nu­
clear threat has grown exponentially. In some of the more extreme cases, 
several senators have begun asking for support to make a motion to the 
President for military intervention. Eventually, Senator Doe is asked to 
sign a petition for their cause. Senator Doe decides that he must take the 
concerns, priorities, and beliefs of the voters in his state into account be­
fore he can make a decision as their representative. 
In order to accurately and quickly gather the opinions and con­
cerns of his constituents, John opens a polling section on his website which 
is advertised across his entire state. The poll asks for each participant to 
express their beliefs about the effectiveness of potential solutions, the im­
mediate threat posed, and ultimately, whether or not he should endorse 
military action. 
Historically, Senator Doe's state has opposed similar legislation 
and government involvement in foreign affairs; however, in this particular 
case, the voters have voted in favor of a preemptive military strike.1 In or­
der to do his job, John must sign the petition. However, if he does not take 
the proper precautions, he could be making his decision based on mali­
cious behavior instead of the seemingly new political paradigm in his state. 
Understandably, this is an extreme case of the problem posed. 
There would be many other considerations in real-life deliberations, but 
Assuming that the number of responses was high enough to be an ac­
curate portrayal of the voting population. 
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data like this carries considerable weight. Many politicians have similar 
polls on their websites for less pressing matters and make legislative deci­
sions based on that data. Maintaining the integrity of that information is 
of the utmost importance. While security for Internet applications is an 
ever-distant goal, we do have tools to help us filter out bad data and limit 
our susceptibility to such attacks. 
To begin, we need to establish a clear standard and goal by which 
a fair and open Internet poll can be considered successful. That goal is to 
collect the opinions of a specific population2 in a way that each person's 
opinion is considered equally3 while maintaining a high degree of acces­
sibility. Many checks and methodologies exist to assist in solving the wide 
array of concerns and vulnerabilities present. This paper will primarily fo­
cus on "flooding" attacks, where single users respond many times in order 
to promote a single response, or set of responses.4 
Any fair poll should give equal weight to each response, and en­
suring this is a trivial matter; however, making sure equal weight is given 
to each person is a different matter. If a person responds to a poll multiple 
times, and each vote is counted fairly, then their voice is made louder. Ma-
1icious software that continuously votes in polls like these is fairly com­
mon. Within seconds, thousands of illegitimate responses can flood the 
system. How can the real data be sorted out? 
In these instances we need to be careful about how we remove 
data. We need a method that doesn't rely upon our preconception of how 
popular the response is. If we used a methodology like this, then we would 
be led to assume that any surprising outcomes were the result of malicious 
voting. More information is needed to increase the probability that we find 
illegitimate votes without throwing out any of the legitimate votes. 
Since these systems typically vote as fast as they can for a predeter­
mined number of votes or time, it would be a reasonable first step to store 
a timestamp with each vote. Now if a large number of votes for the same 
option appear within a narrow time span, we have a clue that a block of 
2 This should be a well defined population; i.e. the voting populace of 
Texas, the students of a specific class, or the visitors of a specific website. 
3 This means that the votes shouldn't be weighted by status, repetitive vot-
ing is disallowed, etc. 
4 By repeatedly voting for the same responses, the chosen option becomes 
a clear outlier, regardless of how unpopular the option may actually be. 
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data is probably the result of a flood. This method does have a drawback: it 
doesn't scale very well. 
If a website is trying to collect the opinions of every person who 
comes across it, similar to CNN.com, then their large amount of traffic 
could easily account for behavior like this. The method also begins to fail 
if the attacker tunes down the speed of the flood and allows for a vote or 
two to interrupt a few of theirs. Some of these programs are also trained to 
select different responses with each vote, while still making their intended 
selection a clear statistical outlier. Clearly, we need a better detection strat­
egy. 
Instead of focusing on the votes themselves, it can be helpful to 
think about identifying the voter. A poll in which only account holding 
members are allowed to vote is an obvious choice. Then we can link the 
username to the vote. After voting once, a user cannot vote again, and 
with reasonable security measures we can prevent fake accounts from be­
ing quickly set up. With this option more information about the voter is 
available. Naturally, anonymity is a major concern. Further, requiring an 
account will be a deterrent to a large number of voters, which may skew 
polling data. 
A less intrusive requirement is to store the IP address of the source 
of the vote. If we collect this alone, we have a means of identifying a com­
puter without storing any intrusive information. Thus, votes that have 
matching IP addresses can be discarded; however, not every machine has a 
globally unique IP address. The number of devices connected to the Inter­
net is far greater than the number of addresses. In order to continue adding 
devices without breaking the underlying structure that the Internet op­
erates upon, Network Address Translation (NAT) and the Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) were created. 
These two technologies allow a single address to be shared by mul­
tiple devices in the case of NAT, or a set of addresses to be leased out as 
needed with DHCP. So we cannot assume that each address directly cor­
responds to a unique individual, but this does help us narrow our search 
window. Now the attacker would have to vote at a reduced speed, spread 
the results across several categories, and occasionally swap IP addresses5 to 
completely avoid suspicion. The added complexity will dampen the impact 
5 Proxy services and Tor allow users to do this for anonymity's sake. 
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significantly, considering that each step requires a more complex program 
and consumes more time. 
Naturally storing more information makes things more expensive 
on our end. It would be nice if the information could be stored on a com­
puter after it had been used to vote. This common practice is accomplished 
with cookies, a datum that servers give to browsers for communicative 
purposes. If we check for cookies before any voting occurs, and make sure 
we distribute them after voting we can deny users that try to vote again. As 
with the other approaches, this has flaws as well. Cookies can be silently 
denied by browsers, and can also be deleted by users. There is no way to 
ensure that the data stored outside of our computer has not been tampered 
with or removed.6 
Lastly, we can add a captcha to our site. Captchas are tests that 
are more easily solved by humans than computers. The most common ex­
ample of this is extracting a word or two from a blurred, unclear, chaotic 
background. The human brain is able to recognize the patterns fairly well 
and see the real text. Since computer vision is still a budding area, they will 
typically fail these tests. Again, this method only works with some prob­
ability, and research into artificial intelligence reduces the effectiveness of 
such solutions. 
No one of these methods is an absolute solution. Each gives us 
another screen to filter the data, but bad information can still get through. 
They are intended to reduce the potential impact of an attack by making 
the process more complex. These hurdles make it far more difficult and 
time consuming for a human to manually vote multiple times, and also 
vastly increase the complexity and time required to build an autonomous 
voter. 
With this information in hand, it should now be clear why extra 
caution should be used in conjunction with an online poll. Simple attacks 
like these are one of many concerns associated with digital voting, and far 
more complex attacks are also quite common. Voting software, built by 
the Federal Government, to tally absentee ballots electronically were made 
public to security analysts for a test election. Researchers at the University 
6 Technically speaking, through the use of a rootkit or another exploit, 
the cookie could be forcefully and secretly stored; however, this method is illegal 
and unethical. 
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of Michigan were able to crack the system in a matter of hours, and pushed 
Futurama's Bender to a winning position. During this attack, they were 
also able to remove their digital footprint from the server.7 
Significant checks need to be added to make polls as reliable as 
possible, and plenty of real world examples demonstrate the absence of 
such systems. More research into this problem and the defense mecha­
nisms associated with it is needed. The content creators of the Internet 
should use their due diligence when selecting and implementing any sort 
of software on their websites, especially when critical decisions are made 
based on the data that they collect. Researchers, planning committees, cor­
porations, and politicians are currently using insecure polls and the data 
they collect every day. The data that can be gathered is powerful, and the 
ability to control it is even more impressive. 
7 Slashtot.org, "Voting System Test Hack Elects Futurama's Bender To 
School Board:' March 2, 2012. 
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